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Preface
Money manager capitalism has resulted in a series of boom-and-bust cycles
in equities, real estate, and commodities. Because subsequent cycles have
been increasingly damaging to the U.S. economy, we are now at the point
where we are experiencing the most severe financial crisis since the Great
Depression. Hasty interventions (bailouts) by Congress, the Treasury, and
the Federal Reserve are attempting to keep the financial industry solvent,in
the belief that government inaction would result in a prolonged recession.
Levy Institute scholars have recognized the problems confronting the
U.S.economy for some time,and we have warned about severe disruptions
in the marketplace in the absence of public policy reform. In this topical
brief by Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray, he concludes that policymakers
must fundamentally change the structure of our economic system, break
the cycle of booms and busts,and reduce the influence of managed money,
as well as prevent the next speculative boom in yet another asset class.
Wray analyzes various explanations for the recent explosion in com-
modity prices: supply and demand, market manipulation, and financial
speculation.He finds that the rise of investments in the commodity futures
markets (“index speculation”) has contributed the most to higher com-
modity prices. He criticizes the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), which actively promoted the notion that commodity futures are
an asset class while ignoring the price effects from speculative inflows of
managed money along with its congressional mandate to ensure that com-
modities prices reflect the laws of supply and demand.
Traditionally,futuresmarketshavebeenused tohedgeprice riskandfor
“price discovery.” However, in opposition to traditional economic theory,
price changes in the commodity markets originate in the futures markets
and are transmitted directly to the spot markets. And, in contrast to prior
commodity booms, futures prices have been above spot prices. When spot6 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
prices are set in reference to futures prices, a speculative boom is triggered,
because rising spot prices validate expectations and fuel greater demandfor
futurescontracts.Thisresponsesuggestsamarketthatisdominatedbyspec-
ulative demand (i.e., managed money from index speculators).
The commodity markets deviate from the perfectly competitive mod-
els of economic theory and generate perverse incentives to incur excess
risk. There is substantial evidence that prices are administered rather than
set by the fundamental forces of supply and demand.Many reinforcing fac-
tors have created a perfect storm in which all participant interests are in
continued price gains.
Wray determines that speculation, rather than fundamentals, domi-
nates the boom in the commodity futures markets (contrary to the notions
of both NYMEX and the CFTC). Supply is largely controlled to set the
price, while demand from end users is supplemented by the demand from
arbitragers, manipulators, hedgers, speculators, and index “investors.”
Furthermore, CFTC regulations have allowed pension and other passive
investment funds to surge into the commodity markets. The end users of
commodities cannot win by hedging because they continue to pay progres-
sively higher prices. Moreover, the dominant players in the futures markets
havenointerestintakingpossessionof theunderlyingphysicalcommodities.
Policymakers should not allow money managers to drive commodity
prices beyond the reaches of consumers, says Wray. He recommends an
increase in the CFTC budget so that the agency can broaden its mission,
provide greater transparency, and limit the effects of speculation on com-
modity prices. He also recommends that Congress begin considering its
response to the inevitable collapse of commodity prices.
Wray believes that bailouts will be needed, but with strings
attached in the form of regulatory constraints. The proposed Commodity
Speculation Reform Act (July 2008) to amend the Commodity Exchange
Act of 1936 would accomplish several of the objectives outlined in this
brief. However, the proposed act does not address the bigger problem: the
propensity of managed money to destabilize one market after another.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
October 2008The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
We do live in interesting times. Over the past decade, we’ve seen what are
arguably the biggest equity, housing, and commodities booms in U.S. his-
tory. Could it be a coincidence? I’ve previously argued that the U.S. real
estate bubble was not an isolated event that resulted from spontaneous
mass delusion or excessive monetary ease, and, indeed, that the financial
crisis spawned by problems in subprime mortgages would spread far
beyond housing debt (Wray 2008). Following Hyman P. Minsky, I blamed
money manager capitalism—the current economic system that dominates
the global economy, characterized by highly leveraged funds seeking max-
imum returns in an environment that systematically underprices risk. In
this paper, I will argue that the commodities boom is no different. Soaring
energy and commodity prices are the direct product of a boom-bust cycle
that is getting progressively more damaging to the economy.
With little regulation or supervision of financial institutions, money
managers have concocted increasingly esoteric and complex instruments
andpracticesthatspreadasquicklyasadeadlyvirusinasci-fiflick.Contrary
to what is taught in economics and business courses,markets generate per-
verse incentives for excess risk, punishing those who are reluctant to join
the bandwagon with relatively low returns. Those who do play along are
rewarded,because highly leveraged funding drives up prices for the under-
lying assets—whether they are dot-com stocks or Las Vegas homes—until
the inevitable collapse.But memories are short,dumb money is ample,and
bailouts are frequent.Since each bust wipes out only a portion of the man-
aged money, a new boom inevitably rises like Phoenix out of the ashes.
Commodities are simply its latest reincarnation.
To make matters worse, the consequence of each boom (and bust) is
more severe than the previous one. It is fairly easy to look back with some
amusement at the fate of pets.com. Do we really care that a handful of
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geeky Internet gazillionaires made and lost fortunes based on business
models fabricated to burn through foolish people’s money? We might even
be able to overlook the recession that followed the NASDAQ crash in April
2000. However, it is not so easy to ignore the real suffering of homeowners
across the nation as they face foreclosure and eviction. The “financializa-
tion” of America’sresidentialrealestate,whichturnedhomesovertoagiant
international casino, will undoubtedly impose large economic and social
costs for many years to come.Worse still is the financialization of food and
energy. Many Americans are being forced to cut back on driving, heating
their homes,or even buying groceries at the supermarket.The world’s poor,
meanwhile, are starving, as managed money puts the price of food out of
reach (Pimentel 2008, Steinberg 2008).
To be sure, it is very difficult to determine how much fault should be
placed in the laps of money managers,because there are a number of forces
coming together in a “perfect storm” to drive up commodity prices. Still,
there is adequate evidence that financialization is a big part of the problem,
and there is sufficient cause for policymakers to intervene with sensible
constraintsandoversighttoreducetheinfluenceof managedmoneyinthese
markets. Further, there is every reason to believe that this boom is going to
crash in a particularly ugly way, so it is not too early to begin formulating
the proper policy response to the coming collapse. Finally, if history is any
guide (as former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was fond of
putting it), we can expect the managed money that survives the coming
crash to search for yet another asset class. Hence, policy ought to be refor-
mulated to try to prevent the next speculative boom.
We will begin with an analysis of three explanations for the explosion
of commodity prices in recent years. While these are sometimes presented
as rivals, I will argue that simply because one explanation is valid, the oth-
ers are not necessarily incorrect. Indeed, there are synergies at work, such
that the forces driving prices higher reinforce one another. We will first
look at the typical explanation provided by economists: it is all a simple
matter of supply and demand. Supplies are naturally constrained, while
demand has been climbing rapidly. A nod is usually given in the direction
of the booming economies of India and China,along with the warning that
any attempt to regulate or supervise financial and commodity markets will
just make things worse.All that can be done is to encourage the supply sideThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
by, for example, opening up the Arctic to more resource exploitation. The
market will then efficiently allocate resources among competing wants.
The second story involves market manipulation by commodity pro-
ducers and traders. Indeed, in recent weeks the Justice Department has
hinted at wide-ranging investigations,and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) has announced actions taken against traders who
conspired to raise oil prices. As we know, there is a long history of price
manipulation in the metals market (readers will recall the Hunt brothers’
attempt to corner the silver market),and the volumes on these markets are
smallenoughthatitispossibletohideaninventorysufficienttoforceprices
up (a point even financial columnist Paul Krugman admits, although he
prefers the supply and demand story).
Finally, the most popular explanation in the nation’s capital today is
that financial speculation in commodity futures markets is the real culprit.
Both the Senate and the House have held hearings into this issue, with
impassioned testimony presented on both sides. So far, most of the discus-
sion has centered around oil prices, with airlines, truckers, and other users
of fuel blaming speculators, while financial market representatives (as well
as most economists) reject these claims as naïve. However, the boom in
commodity prices is broad-based, so any analysis must go beyond oil.
I will argue that all three explanations are plausible, and the identified
mechanisms,mutually reinforcing.However,it appears quite likely that the
rise of investments in commodity indexes—a particular kind of speculation
that has been called “index speculation”—is the most important cause.
Further, commodities merely represent the latest asset class identified by
money manager capitalism as ripe for financialization. On the one hand,
this means that the problem is mostly human made. Rising energy and
food prices do not result, for the most part, from any “natural” shortages.
It would thus appear relatively easy to reverse price trends. On the other
hand, it means that the problem is systemic—it results from the operation
of the type of capitalism we have inherited. Only fundamental changes to
the structure of our economic system can break the cycle of boom and
bust, and halt the continual search for new asset classes. It won’t be easy,
but it isn’t impossible.
A final note: as this brief is being prepared for publication, commod-
ity prices appear to have reversed course. While this provides welcome10 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
relief, it does not mean we are out of the woods yet. Falling commodity
prices will generate problems;production decisions as well as portfolio allo-
cations have been made on the expectation of rising prices. A lot of lever-
aged money has gone into commodity markets (including physicals as well
as futures), so just as falling real estate prices are devastating for house-
holds, for the real estate sector generally, and for financial markets, there
will be significant fallout from the slump in commodity prices. Further,
without fundamental reform, we can expect managed money to begin its
search for yet another asset class to financialize. Just as managed money
moved from equities, to real estate, and, finally, to commodities, a collapse
of this market will push funds into yet another. Thus, a policy response is
still necessary.
Supply and Demand
Food riots. Grounded jets. Plummeting SUV sales. Pictures of starving
children around the world. Rising prices at the pump and in the grocery
aisles. The return of stagflation and the misery index (the sum of inflation
and unemployment). We all see the consequences of rising commodity
prices. Figure 1 shows that spending on energy in the United States has
risen to an estimated 14 percent of GDP in 2008—even more than during
the last energy crisis. This time around, that is supplemented by unprece-
dented across-the-board inflation of commodity prices. Even as the econ-
omy slips deeper into recession, policy is hamstrung by memories of the
last bout of double-digit inflation almost 30 years ago.
We“know”from our“principles of economics”textbook that the cause
must lie somewhere between the “scissors” of supply and demand. Excess
demand drives prices higher; fortunately, the process is self-correcting, as
higher prices depress demand and call forth more supply. This could take
some time to return to equilibrium, especially if government policies arti-
ficially inflate demand or restrict supply. For example, in a “misguided”
attempt to help poor families buy food, many governments around the
world have subsidized purchases—providing extra income that only helps
to drive prices even higher.Or,government restricts the supply response by
prohibiting oil exploration and drilling in protected wildernesses. Some
governments have engaged in “beggar thy neighbor” policy by restrictingThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
food exports to preserve domestic production for their own citizens,thereby
worsening food shortages (and driving up prices) elsewhere. The solution
is to allow rising prices to diminish quantity demand, to encourage substi-
tution into commodities that are more abundant, and to increase supply.
In short,let the market work its wonders.Krugman (2008) has been one of
the most prominent proponents of this view.
We will look in some detail at commodity indexes that include prices
of abouttwodozen basiccommodities.Forthemoment,I justwantto pro-
vide some data on the dizzying acceleration of price increases. Most of the
press has focused on rising oil,corn,and gold prices.But,in fact,the boom
has taken place across a wide range of commodities,and,indeed,is unprece-
dented in scope and size.According to an analysis by market strategist Frank
Veneroso (2008d), over the course of the 20th century, there were only 13
instances in which the price of a single commodity rose by 500 percent or
more. For example, the price of sugar rose 641 percent in 1920, and in the
sameyear,thepriceof cottonrose538percent.In1947,therewasacommodi-
ties boom across three commodities:pork bellies (1,053 percent),soybean oil
(797percent),andsoybeans(558percent).DuringtheHuntbrothersepisode,
in 1980, silver prices were driven up by 3,813 percent. Now, if we look at the
currentcommoditiesboom,therearealreadyeightcommodities whose price
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Actual
Estimated12 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
rise had reached 500 percent or more by the end of June: heating oil (1,313
percent), nickel (1,273 percent), crude oil (1,205 percent), lead (870 per-
cent), copper (606 percent), zinc (616 percent), tin (510 percent), and
wheat (500 percent). Many other agricultural, energy, and metals com-
moditieshavealsohadlargepricehikes,albeitbelowthatthreshold(forthe
25 commodities typically included in the indexes, the average price rise
since 2003 has been 203 percent) (Masters and White 2008). There is no
evidence of any other commodities price boom to match the current one
in terms of scope.
It is true that there have been recent supply problems associated with
someof thesecommodities.Forexample,therewerelabordisputesinChilean
copper mines that interrupted supply.An unusual number of oil refineries
have been temporarily shut down, and there has been a longer-term trend
of permanent closures and consolidation in the refinery industry.Thereare
also all of the“peak oil”arguments (e.g., global production will begin to fall
due to resource constraints),although if it is true that production is nearing
its technical maximum, the price rise should be gradual rather than abrupt.
Still,economistsarguethatif demandisextremelypriceinelastic(consumers
of the commodities do not reduce purchases even as prices rise),then prices
could rise sharply whenever demand exceeds supply.
Mostof thosefavoringthesupplyanddemandstorylooktothedemand
side. In particular, this camp maintains that the rapid development of
China and India is driving demand to increase in the face of a fairly inelas-
tic supply, thereby boosting prices (Gros 2008). Add supply constraints to
themix,andpricescouldrisequickly.Whilethisstoryisappealing,itisalso
flawed. World growth has not been unusually high—rapid expansion in
partsofAsiaisoffsetbysluggisheconomiesinAfricaandEurope.According
to the World Bank’s estimates of inflation-adjusted GDP growth, there
appears to be nothing unusual in the current growth cycle, which started
from very low growth in 2001 (below 2 percent) and has climbed to nearly
4 percent at its peak (Veneroso 2008a). While that might be considered
respectable,peaksinthe1980swereconsiderablyhigher,whilethoseachieved
in the 1960s were almost twice as high.
Of course,notallgrowthisthesame,anditisconceivablethatthedevel-
opment path chosen by China, in particular, generates high consumption of
oilandothercommodities.However,theUnitedStatesisalsoprofligatein itsThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
consumption of some of these commodities—it is quite energy inefficient
(using more oil per unit of GDP than other developed nations), and also
inefficient in its use of some agricultural commodities (its grain and soy-
beans run through cows—losing 90 percent of the food value—or,increas-
ingly, through its cars,rather than more efficiently through its people).But
even as the U.S. economy slowed considerably over the past year, prices
remained firm. Americans have responded to rising gasoline prices in the
manner economists expect, with consumption falling sufficiently to offset
China’s increased use of crude oil—yet crude prices barely responded.
1
Figure 2 shows U.S.,Chinese,and global oil consumption since 2001.While
itistruethatChina’sdemandwasgrowingveryrapidlyearlyinthisdecade,
the growth rate fell off as oil prices rose. U.S. consumption stabilized by
mid-decade, long before oil prices peaked.
Further, if the underlying cause had been “peak oil” and the fear of
falling supply that drove prices, that should have been relieved to some
extent by new discoveries of oil (e.g.,in Brazil and Greenland;indeed,proven
oil reserves have been increasing at a rate of 2.5 percent per year since 2004,
faster than consumption has grown) or expanded exploitation of substitutes
(oil shales in the United States, and oil sands in Venezuela and Canada;







































Source: Energy Information Administration14 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
together, these exceed the total proven global oil reserves, and the cost
of production is as low as $14.50 per barrel equivalent) (Eckaus 2008).
Moreover, even if oil is running out, according to Hotelling’s rule (com-
monly applied to depletable resources), oil prices should rise at the rate of
interest if production costs remain constant. Obviously, prices have been
rising very much faster than that. Finally, it has long been understood that
the long-run price of a commodity produced under competitive condi-
tions should approach the marginal cost of production; for many com-
modities, those costs actually fall in real terms due to innovations to the
production process—so that market prices rise more slowly than overall
inflation (Masters andWhite 2008).This is why investors have long shunned
commodities as an inflation hedge. To the degree that oil markets as well as
the markets for many other commodities are not competitive, these con-
straintsonpricerisesmaynotapply.Still,thereislittlereasontoattributethe
tremendous price hikes experienced in the past few years to“peak oil”fears.
MIT’s Richard Eckaus (2008) also dispenses with the argument that
the oil price boom is due to political instability in the Middle East.Nothing
significant has happened in the region; indeed,tensions between Israel and
Syriahavecooledabit.WhileIranhasmadethenews,ithasneverthreatened
to cut off supplies,and has even announced plans to increase production by
a billion barrels daily. Dollar depreciation is often tagged as a contributing
cause to price hikes,as producers try to maintain purchasing power of their
dollarrevenues.Yetthedollarfellbyonly10percentagainsttheeurobetween
2004 and mid-2008,even as oil prices quadrupled over the same period.
In any case,it is a bit too facile to resort to“supply and demand”expla-
nations. Many who have used this argument graphed crude oil supplies
with a demand curve and showed that they more or less match. Since sup-
ply just barely kept pace with demand, higher prices were needed to meet
the demand. But it is always true that for every seller there must have been
a buyer,or the transaction would not have occurred—something that holds
no matter what the price is. Simply because supply and demand must be
equal at the market price tells us little about the determination of that price.
If markets are perfectly competitive (i.e., they contain so many buyers
and sellers that none can influence the price), then the story provided by
economists makes some sense—demand might have grown faster than sup-
ply. Under idealized conditions, markets will then adjust quantity demandedThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
and quantity supplied, with sellers and buyers reacting to price. Trouble is,
commodity markets—especially oil—are far from perfectly competitive.
Manyareproducedinconditions of oligopoly (afew producers—OPECand
Russia in the case of oil) and/or are sold to oligopsonists (a few buyers—
ADM and Cargill in the case of grains),who mediate between oil producers
and consumers. In addition, many commodities are targeted by govern-
ment policy.As crude oil prices rose,the U.S.Congress decided to subsidize
biofuels production on a massive scale, boosting corn and soybean prices
even as biofuels production increased the use of oil (given U.S.agricultural
practices, production of the crops is energy-intensive) (Mufson 2008).
And,as mentioned above,when food shortages appeared,nations began to
prohibit food exports—driving global prices higher.Attributing these price
pressures to“supply and demand”is misleading.
Further,economists’arguments ignore impacts of expected future prices
onproductiontoday.Even if prices are rising,producers might not increase
production if they believe it is best to wait until prices climb even higher.
Indeed, the Saudis have made precisely that argument: if all of the peak-oil
arguments are correct, then prices in the future will be very much higher
than they are today; hence, it is best to leave the oil in the ground now, so
that Saudis in the future can enjoy higher prices and living standards.
2
Economists also ignore the possibility that an intermediary (we could use
a neutral term like“arbitrager,”or one with a negative connotation:“specu-
lator”) might take the supply off the market to wait for higher prices tomor-
row. If enough of the supply is removed, of course, this will actually
acceleratepricehikes(wewouldusethenastyterm“manipulator”here).Yet
none of these factors is considered in the simple models taught in econom-
ics textbooks. An effective framework must go beyond the conventional
wisdomandconsiderthesepossibilities.Inotherwords,weshouldbeskep-
tical of the simplistic application of inappropriate models to real-world
phenomena.
Veneroso’s study of copper markets is particularly intriguing.
Historically, copper use and price has been a very good predictor of reces-
sion, because copper feeds directly into residential construction,which itself
is very procyclical. (Indeed, UCLA economist Edward E. Leamer [2007] has
provided an exhaustive demonstration of this correlation, and has gone
so far as to claim that the “business cycle” is really a residential real estate16 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
construction cycle.) However, in the current cycle, copper has defied the
usual trend.As the U.S.housing boom turned to bust,copper prices contin-
ued to rise. As Veneroso argues, data on consumption of many commodi-
ties are not good, and there is no direct measure of the global demand for
copper. Estimates of the flow of new production exist, and currently total
17 to 18 million tons per year.To obtain a measure of demand,statisticians
take total supply and then deduct estimates of the change to inventories.
The result is called “apparent demand,” and it is subject to mismeasure-
ment of both supply and inventory changes. For most countries, there is
little information on changes to inventory, so the estimates of apparent
demand are usually suspect.
Critical to the supply and demand argument is the growing demand
in China that might have offset the collapse of U.S. demand. Veneroso
reports that, for 2007, China’s domestic production of copper increased by
20 percent and its net imports doubled, so that the total supply of copper
to China was up by almost 40 percent—twice as high as in any previous
year. If China had actually used this amount of copper last year, it could
explain why prices continued to rise even as U.S.consumption fell.However,
Veneroso claims that China’s government actually keeps fairly good records
on copper use, with estimates showing growth of demand somewhere on
the order of 8–19 percent over the course of the year. In other words, the
growth of supply seems to have been at least twice as great as the growth of
demand. If so, then roughly one million tons of copper have flowed into
unrecordedinventoriesinChina—ahugeproportionof theworld’ssupply.
Veneroso believes there is perhaps another million tons of copper world-
wide that is “missing,” presumably held in unreported inventories. If true,
a lot of copper is being held off the market, and thus helping to fuel rising
prices (Veneroso 2007, 2008b, 2008c). In the next section, I will examine
the possibility that prices are being manipulated in this manner. Again, a
simple textbook “suppy and demand” story sheds little light by itself—
given that these markets do not operate anything like the perfectly compet-
itivemarketsshowninthetextbooks.Whatwereallyneedtoknowiswhere
the demand comes from, and who controls the supply.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
Manipulation of Supplies and Prices
In recent years, there have been several well-publicized cases of commod-
ity price manipulation. For example, in winter 2004, British Petroleum
monopolized 90 percent of all TET propane supplies (propane transported
via the east Texas pipeline system, the primary means by which deliveries
are made to the Northeast and Midwest), and withheld enough from the
market to drive prices up. In 2007, it reached a court settlement, agreeing
to pay $303 million in penalties and restitution (Stupak 2007). Amaranth
manipulated natural gas spot prices by driving down futures contract prices
inthelast30minutesof tradingfortheMarch,April,andMay2006contracts.
It made profits by shorting positions in the InterContinental Exchange (ICE)
market before collapsing in September 2006. Other well-known cases
include the Hunt brothers’ manipulation of silver prices, Marc Rich and
MannyWeiss’ssqueezeonaluminum,theSumitomocopperaffair,andTiger
Management’s “adjustment” of the palladium market (Veneroso 2008d).
More recently, on July 22, SemGroup filed for bankruptcy after it suffered
$3.2 billion in losses on oil futures and derivatives, allegedly due to unau-
thorized speculation by its cofounder and former CEO (Campbell 2008).It
is not clear at this point whether the speculation consisted of outright
manipulation or was simply a series of ill-advised bets. In any case, there is
little doubt that manipulation played some role in the commodities price
rise—at least for some commodities.
Acting Chairman Walter L. Lukken (2008b) has argued the primary
mission of the CFTC is “detecting and rooting out illegal and intentional
manipulationof the markets.”(See also,Lukken2008a.)After crudeoil prices
exploded, the CFTC put together a Nationwide Crude Oil Investigation that
culminated in charges levied in July 2008 against Optiver for price manipula-
tionbackinMarch2007(Henriques2008).The CFTC found that its traders
had successfully moved prices by small amounts to their benefit. Since
2002, the CFTC has filed 42 enforcement actions charging 72 defendants
with manipulation; in addition, the Department of Justice has filed more
than 47 criminal complaints.Still,in an interim report issued July 22,2008,
the CFTC concluded that, although there were these isolated instances of
manipulation,“rising oil prices are largely due to fundamental supply and
demand factors.” This is not altogether comforting given the CFTC’s bias
against intervention, as we will see.18 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
In the next section, I will discuss the possibility that financial markets
have driven prices higher through the use of index funds that allocate a
portion of assets to commodities. It is interesting that the CFTC not only
rejects this interpretation but also implicitly denies that such activity is
within its“core mission,”which is narrowly construed to detect the“illegal
and intentional manipulation” of prices. This statement even seems to
reject CFTC responsibility for regulating legal speculation—something
thatwasclearlypartof itsoriginalmission.OnemightarguethattheCFTC
misses the forest for the trees as it focuses on individual traders who ille-
gally move prices by a few basis points to make small profits,while pension
funds and hedge funds might be increasing prices fivefold through legal
buy-and-hold strategies. In other words, by limiting its concern to illegal
manipulation, the CFTC ignores the much larger impacts on prices that
result from speculative inflows of managed money.
Indeed,it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the CFTC bears some
responsibility for encouraging the massive flow of managed money into
the commodity futures market in the first place when it actively promoted
the notion that commodity futures should be seen as an asset class.Even as
lateasDecember19,2007—thatis,longafteritwasobviousthatacommodi-
ties price boom was under way—the CFTC released a study purporting to
show that the returns on benchmark commodities remained uncorrelated
withreturnsonequityinvestments.Thus,“commoditymarketsseemtohave
retained their role as a portfolio diversification tool” (CFTC 2007). In the
next section,we will show how this contrasts with the well-accepted under-
standing of the primary role that commodity futures markets should play.
However, diversification provides the main justification for managed flows
into commodity markets. Rather than showing concern, the CFTC was
encouragingevengreaterflows.Inaddition,thecommissionhassteadfastly
denied that the flow of managed money impacted commodity prices. For
example, in its interim report issued last July, the CFTC clung to the argu-
ment that “fundamentals” remain the principal cause of rising prices
(CFTC 2008a). Only after determined prodding by elected representatives
in Washington did CFTC officials admit that their conclusions were not
justified by their analyses, promising to collect more data before releasing
their final report, which was issued on September 11.
3 The inspector gen-
eral for the CFTC recently began an investigation to determine whether theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
CFTC’s interim report had intentionally misled Congress in order to help
defeat antispeculation legislation
4 (Talley 2008).
These actions seem to have followed a long-term hands-off approach
to commodity markets by the executive branch. When the House consid-
ered legislation that would direct the CFTC to set and administer position
limits across a range of commodity futures, the Bush administration sig-
naled that it “strongly opposed” the bill and that the president would veto
it. The CFTC has instituted position limits in the past, but it has also
authorized a loophole that, beginning in 1991, allows exemptions for swap
dealers
5;similarly,theNewYorkMercantileExchange(NYMEX)hasgranted
a large number of exemptions from position limits, the majority of which
were for speculative rather than hedging purposes (Dingell and Stupak
2008).JustastheFedunderGreenspan’sleadershiprefusedtoimposemargin
limitsduringtheNASDAQboom,theCFTChasfailedtoexerciseitsmandate
to constrain leveraged positions in commodity futures. Those familiar with
the 1980s savings-and-loan fiasco will recall a similar hands-off treatment by
many regulators, who saw their role as something akin to “cheerleading”—
best represented by William Seidman, who, while chairman of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, announced to his staff: “Bankers are our
friends; the FDIC should be a friend of the industry”—like a“trade associa-
tion” for the industry (Mayer 1990). Cheerleaders do not make good regula-
tors. Unfortunately, at least some of the CFTC’s actions appear to border on
just this sort of boosterism.
6
As an example, so-called “black pools” were first encouraged in 1993
by Wendy Lee Gramm, then chair of the CFTC, who exempted from regu-
lation customized energy derivatives that did not trade on registered
exchanges. Congress extended this in 2000’s Commodity Futures
Modernization Act by including the “Enron loophole,” so that unregulated
over-the-counter electronic exchanges would not be required to keep records
or to file reports with the CFTC (Davis 2008b, Engdahl 2008). The Enron
fiasco that resulted did not deter the CFTC from granting further exemp-
tions from oversight. In January 2006, the commission allowed ICE (the
leader in electronic energy exchanges) to provide trading terminals in the
United States for the trading of U.S.oil futures on the ICE futures exchange
in London—promoting an escape route around the CFTC-regulated
NYMEX. Thus, U.S. traders using terminals in the United States to trade20 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
U.S. commodity futures were exempt from U.S. regulatory oversight. ICE
accounts for more than a third of trading, on average, and total unregu-
lated over-the-counter commodity trades are now estimated at $9 trillion,
versus $5 trillion on regulated exchanges. Hence, the CFTC actually encour-
aged development of a largely unregulated competitor to the lightly regu-
lated U.S. exchanges.
In any case,the CFTC is woefully understaffed,raising questions about
its ability to oversee even the regulated part of the market. As of last year,
it had only 437 employees, 12 percent fewer than it had in 1976, while the
size of the market it supervises has grown more than a thousandfold over
that span (Davis 2008a). Although in recent months the CFTC has indi-
cated greater interest in expanding its reach (indeed, the commission has
lately gained some authority over formerly exempt commercial markets
suchasICE),itschief enforcementofficeratthetime,GregoryMocek,
7wor-
ried that extending surveillance to the huge “swap market” would cost too
much (Davis 2008a). Unless Congress and the president are willing to allo-
cate a much larger budget to the CFTC,it is unlikely that oversight will sig-
nificantly improve.
The point of all of this is,so long as the term“manipulation”is limited
to the actions of individual traders, it cannot play a significant role in the
current commodities price boom, since the most important markets—oil,
soybeans, corn, wheat—are too big to be influenced for anything but the
shortest time period. There are stories of oil tankers sent on roundabout
routes to try to keep oil off the market for a few days. There are a handful
of rogue traders who try to move prices for a few minutes in order to com-
plete trades. There might be a conspiracy to time maintenance shutdowns
at oil refineries around the world, thereby constraining production. Still,
the oil market is too big and there are too many players and too much
incentive to take advantage of current high prices for narrowly defined
“manipulation” to explain the historic run-up of crude oil prices over the
past few years. In the case of agricultural commodities like corn and soy-
beans, markets are again too big to be manipulable across growing seasons.
However, as Veneroso has argued, metals markets are small, and we know
they have been manipulated in the past.So it is far more plausible that nar-
rowly defined manipulation has affected prices of the smaller commodity
markets. Note also how the manipulation of supplies complements theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
supply and demand story from the previous section. So, in conclusion, the
manipulation of commodity markets by a few handfuls of suppliers and
intermediaries probably goes some way toward explaining the temporary
price increases in at least a portion of the commodities market,but it is not
likely to explain the broad-based commodities boom over the extended
run-up in prices that has been taking place for several years.
What is potentially far more important is the impact of large pools of
managed money following similar strategies, without any necessity for
explicit collusion.In the case of the subprime boom,we now know that the
underlying mortgages were packaged into securities, blessed by ratings
agencies, and marketed by Wall Street using similar statistical methods to
assess risk. Regulators and supervisors responsible for protecting home-
owners, financial institutions, and pension funds turned a blind eye to the
systemic risk created (and in notable cases even led the cheers for the new
instruments and practices; recall that Greenspan promoted the highly toxic
option ARMS for subprime borrowers) (Wray 2008). It appears that the
CFTC is now doing the same, focusing on individual price manipulators
while ignoring its Congressional mandate to ensure that commodity prices
reflect the laws of supply and demand. The U.S. Commodity Exchange Act
states,“Excessive speculation in any commodity under contracts of sale of
such commodity for future delivery . . . causing sudden or unreasonable
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of such commodity . . . is
an undue and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce in such com-
modity,”anddirectstheCFTCtoestablishtradinglimits“astheCommission
findsarenecessarytodiminish,eliminate,orprevent suchburden”(Engdahl
2008).Unfortunately,the CFTC has instead allowed,and even encouraged,
expansion of the portion of the market that is unregulated—the “black
pools” of futures trading that are hidden from view—as it trains its sights
on illegal manipulation.
As I will discuss in the next section, it is possible that commodity
prices have been pushed by massive inflows of managed money following
a“buy and hold”strategy that is self-reinforcing precisely because it will be
successful so long as the flows are large enough. This could have been cur-
tailed if the CFTC had assumed a broader mandate.22 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
Index Speculation in Commodity Futures Markets
In late 2005, a friend working in financial markets told me that the Alaska
Permanent Fund was considering allocating a portion of its portfolio to oil
futures indexes. Recall that the purpose of this fund is to reduce Alaska’s
dependence on revenues from its major, nonrenewable resource: oil. The
idea was that a portion of oil revenues would be invested in a diversified
portfolio,withsomeof thereturnspaidtoresidentsintheformof anannual
dividend.At that time, the fund was considering a move to put a portion of
the state’s oil revenues into oil futures (and other commodity futures),
essentially a“doubling down”of its bet on oil.To be sure,it was doing noth-
ing unusual—pension fund managers, university endowments, and hedge
fundswerealldoingthesamething:investingincommodities,includingoil.
To understand why, one needs to know that a number of researchers
had demonstrated that commodity prices are not correlated with returns
from fixed-income instruments (e.g., bonds) and equities (stocks). Thus,
holding commodities would reduce volatility in portfolio returns. Further,
commodities tend to do fairly well in an inflationary environment, so
adding commodities to the portfolio provides an inflation hedge.
8
However, holding commodities is expensive—there are substantial storage
costs in addition to the usual financing or “opportunity” costs involved.
Hence, money managers looked to the commodity futures market: paper
claims to commodities could be held rather than the commodities them-
selves.Becauseafuturescontractwouldexpireonaspecifieddate,theholder
of the paper would then be in a position to receive the commodities. Of
course, these money managers do not want to ever take shipment, so the
contracts are“rolled”on the scheduled date—into another futures contract,
one with a farther-off delivery date.
9
There are three main types of participants in commodity futures mar-
kets: hedgers, traditional speculators, and index speculators. Table 1 offers
a useful classification of each by function. The allocation of a portion of
the portfolio to commodity futures in order to diversify risks is undertaken
by the index speculator. These are typically hedge funds, pension funds,
university endowments, life insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds,
and banks. Most importantly, index speculators only take long positions—
it is a buy-and-hold strategy. To simplify allocation, managed money typi-
cally buys one of the commodity futures indexes—hence the term “indexThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 23
speculator.”
10 The biggest are Standard & Poor’s (S&P) GSCI and the Dow
Jones–AIG Commodity Index (DJ-AIGCI). If index prices rise, they earn
returns.Indeed,becausecommodityfuturescontractsdonotpayanyyield,
the only possible source of return is an increase in the price of the con-
tracts. For this reason, the purchase of a commodity futures index is fun-
damentally a speculative activity.Prior to the 1990s,the“prudent investor”
rule prohibited pension plans from buying commodity futures contracts
(Masters andWhite 2008).It was the collapse of the equities market in 2000
and the discovery that the performance of commodities was not correlated
with equities performance that led to a belief that futures contracts could
be used to reduce portfolio risk. This is what allowed Goldman Sachs as
well as other indexers to successfully push commodity futures as a new
asset class for prudent investors.
“Hedgers”are those with a direct interest in the physical commodities
themselves. They use futures markets to reduce or eliminate losses due to
unforeseen movements in commodity prices. Sellers of commodities take
short positions (agreeing to deliver the commodities on the future date);
buyers take long positions (agreeing to take physical delivery on the contract
expiration date). The CFTC includes hedgers in its “commercial” category.
However, as discussed below, the CFTC also includes swap dealers in the
commercial category, on the argument that at least some of these swaps are
directly related to hedging commodity price risk. The traditional speculator
Table 1 Types of Futures Market Participants
Hedger Index Speculator Traditional Speculator
Sheds Price Risk Takes on Price Risk Takes on Price Risk
Hedges Underlying Position Profits from Price Moves Profits from Price Moves
Consumes Liquidity Consumes Liquidity Provides Liquidity
Price-sensitive Insensitive to Price Price-sensitive
Takes Long and Short
Positions
Takes Long Positions Only
Takes Long and Short
Positions
Source: Masters 2008a24 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
facilitates hedging by taking the other side of the trade with hedgers; in
other words, by taking the price risk that hedgers do not want. Traditional
speculators are said to provide liquidity by increasing the volume of trans-
actions. The CFTC classifies such speculators as “noncommercial,” since
they have no direct interest in the physical commodities. Finally, index
speculators pursue a buy-and-hold strategy, using futures contracts as a
portfolio diversification tool.These are said to“consume liquidity”because
they take only long positions (acting solely as buyers of contracts).Further,
Table 2 Index Component Weights as of July 1,2008
Weighted
S&P GSCI DJ-AIGCI Average
Sector Commodity (percent) (percent) (percent)
Agriculture Cocoa 0.2 0.0 0.2
Coffee 0.5 2.7 2.1
Corn 3.6 6.9 5.2
Cotton 0.7 2.2 1.6
Soybean Oil 0.0 2.9 2.9
Soybeans 0.9 7.4 5.1
Sugar 2.1 2.8 2.6
Wheat 3.0 3.4 3.1
Wheat KC 0.7 0.0 0.7
Livestock Feed Cattle 0.3 0.0 0.3
Lean Hogs 0.8 2.5 1.8
Live Cattle 1.6 4.1 3.0
Energy Brent Crude Oil 14.8 0.0 14.8
WTI Crude Oil 40.6 15.0 36.6
Gasoil 5.4 0.0 5.4
Heating Oil 5.3 4.5 5.1
Gasoline 4.5 4.1 4.4
Natural Gas 7.6 16.0 11.9
Base Metals Aluminum 2.1 6.9 5.1
Lead 0.2 0.0 0.2
Nickel 0.5 1.7 1.2
Zinc 0.4 1.8 1.4
Copper 2.6 6.7 4.9
Precious Metals Gold 1.5 6.1 4.6
Silver 0.2 2.4 2.1
Sources: Standard & Poor’s; Dow JonesThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 25
these are the only market players that are insensitive to price—they allocate
a percentage of their portfolios to each commodity regardless of price.
Index speculators can be included in the commercial category (even
though they never take physical delivery) because they operate in the swaps
market—which, as mentioned above, is counted as commercial activity.
Masters and White (2008) argue that the commodity futures market is the
single market that brings together participants in the physicals market and
speculators in financial derivatives tied to the physicals.
Table 2 shows the dollar weights in the S&P GSCI and DJ-AIGCI
indexes. Energy commodities dominate, with crude oil making up 51.4
percent of the index, and all energy-related products accounting for 78.2
percent. The biggest agricultural commodities weightings are given to
corn, soybeans, and wheat; the largest shares for metals are in aluminum,
copper, and gold. It must be emphasized that, while a 4 percent share
assigned to a commodity might appear small, the size of managed money
funds is gargantuan relative to the size of commodity futures markets.
Table 3 shows estimates provided in Congressional testimony by portfolio
manager Michael W. Masters (2008a) of the quantities of commodities
underlying the contracts held by managed money. For comparison pur-
poses, Masters pointed out that between 2003 and mid-2008, the total
increase in Chinese oil consumption was 920 million barrels, while he cal-
culatedthatindexspeculatorsincreasedtheircontractholdingsby848mil-
lion barrels over the same period.In other words,the increased demand by
managed money for oil futures nearly matched the increase in China’s
demand for actual oil. As another example, index speculators hold con-
tracts for over 1.3 million tons of copper, out of a total annual production
of less than 18 million tons. Between 2002 and 2007, China’s reported
increase in demand for copper was about 2 million tons (note the caveat
above:Veneroso believes that much of this flowed into hidden inventories);
by comparison, the demand for copper futures contracts by index specula-
tors was just under 1.2 million tons (Masters andWhite 2008).Indeed,index
speculatorsnowholdcontractsthatexceedtheannualproductionof allU.S.
copper mines (the United States is the world’s number two producer),
wheat futures that are sufficient to meet America’s demand for wheat for
two years, and contracts on enough corn to supply the U.S. ethanol indus-
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Ausefulwayof assessingtheimpactof indexspeculationoncommod-
ity markets is to examine “open interest.” This is a measure of the dollar
value of positions in commodity futures contracts that are held overnight,
excluding the ebbs and flows of intraday price moves (Masters and White
2008). The final two columns of Table 3 show open interest for 2002 and
2008. Over that period, the dollar value of contracts swelled by a factor of
more than nine—obviously, many orders of magnitude greater than the
growth in demand for the underlying commodities. In a separate calcula-
tion, Masters and White (2008) estimate that the total volume of futures
contracts purchased between January 1, 2003, and mid-March 2008 has
increased by about five million,of which index speculators bought 2.7 mil-
lion—or just over half. By contrast, physical hedgers purchased one-fifth.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the index-speculator tail is wagging
the physical-hedger dog when it comes to commodity futures contracts.
However, comparing the volume and price of futures contracts pur-
chased and the available supply of the physical commodities might appear
to be a comparison of apples and oranges. After all, the pension fund that
buys futures contracts is not actually going to take delivery of the oil.What
is important is that once a fund has decided to allocate,say,5 percent of its
investments to commodity futures,it stays in the commodities.As the total
portfolio grows, the fund continues to increase its holdings of commodity
futures indexes in order to hit its allocation target.
As this strategy caught on, huge volumes of money flowed into the
indexes, and thus into the commodity futures markets. In 2004, there was
a total of about $50 billion in the indexes, growing to above $100 billion in
2006 and to above $300 billion in July 2008. In the first 52 trading days of
2008,$55billionof managedmoneyfrompensionfunds,universityendow-
ments, banks, and sovereign wealth funds poured into commodity futures
markets pursuing the buy-and-hold strategy (Masters 2008a).
Making the case that these inflows of funds have driven the price of
commodity futures ever higher seems easy enough.Most expositions begin
with a figure plotting commodity prices against commodity futures invest-
ments—for example, Figure 3. Note that here I have plotted the spot price
of the S&P GSCI index—an index that reflects the current market price of
25 basic commodities.
11 This is because the concern is whether activity in
futures markets is impacting today’s commodity prices.(Further,as shown28 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
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NYMEX WTI Crude Oil Price (right-hand scale)
Swap Dealers’NYMEX WTI Long Positions (left-hand scale)
Source: CFTC via the House Energy Committee, BloombergThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 29
in Figure 5, spot and futures prices closely track one another; see p. 33.)
Figure 4 plots swap dealers’ long positions in NYMEX crude oil futures
against the price of crude. Recall that most index speculators use swap
dealers to replicate one of the commodity indexes, and as the quantity of
managed money allocated to commodities increases, the number of con-
tracts bought by swap dealers grows. Again, the correlation is strong: as
swap dealers purchase more contracts, the price of oil rises.
Thepictureseemsclear:thematchbetweentheflowof managedmoney
into futures markets and the spot price of commodities is remarkable—
highermoneyinflowsleadtohigherprices.However,asanyeconomistwould
warn,correlation never proves causation.And,indeed,the causation must go
at least both ways: rising prices encourage more inflows, and more inflows
generate higher prices. But even with that caveat, the evidence appears at
least superficially quite strong, and worthy of a call on Washington to do
something about this speculatively driven run-up in commodity prices.
Again, the economist would urge caution. Futures markets play two
essential roles. The first is to enable buyers and sellers to hedge price risk.
A farmer can contract to deliver wheat at harvest at a locked-in price,
secure in the knowledge that,should prices fall before that date,the farmer
will receive the contracted price. At the same time, a commercial bakery
that wants to buy wheat at harvest can use a futures contract to hedge
against the possibility that prices will rise. The problem is that the number
of offers by farmers to sell at harvest will tend to exceed the number of bids
by those who want to contract for delivery at harvest, for a variety of rea-
sons. This results in a “bid-ask spread,” the difference between the price
buyers are willing to pay for future wheat and the price at which sellers are
willing to sell future wheat. An intermediary—or, a traditional specula-
tor—can step in to lower the spread, essentially making a bet on whether
prices are likely to rise (closer to the ask price) or to fall (toward the bid
price). This role can be played by local traders and day traders, who go
“long”by agreeing to take delivery of wheat on the contracted date (on the
expectation of selling the physical-delivery contracts to the end users of the
grain at a higher price than they paid for the contracts).In this manner,spec-
ulatorslowerthespread,andaresaidto“provideliquidity”tothemarketsince
they reduce costs. Such behavior is a common and necessary feature of all
markets that have forward-looking contracts. The fear is that, if government30 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
intervenes to constrain such speculation, it will reduce the “liquidity” that
makes futures markets operate more efficiently: bid-ask spreads will widen,
market costs will be higher and fewer futures contracts will be completed,
and buyers and sellers of commodities will not be able to hedge price risk as
desired. Thus, government should not constrain speculation.
The second role played by futures markets is said to be “price discov-
ery.” Commodities production is often local, while final consumption is
moregeographicallydispersed.Forexample,wheatisfarmedinseveraldis-
tinct rural regions in the United States, with the ultimate consumers of
wheat more than a thousand miles away. Farmers might sell to local grain
elevator owners,who act as intermediaries.Neither the farmer nor the grain
elevator owner has a lot of information about the price that the grain might
ultimately fetch when sold to the food processing industry. However, unlike
the local market for the physical commodity,the commodity futures market
is national, and even international. Futures prices are readily available and
reflect real-time supply and demand. Thus, local physical commodity mar-
kets have come to rely on futures markets as the primary source of price
information on the national and international markets. There is then an
adjustment that is made to reflect local conditions—much as the Kelly Blue
Book adjusts used car values to reflect local market conditions by zip code.
The use of commodity futures markets has eliminated the sometimes
large differences between prices in various regional spot markets that
existed prior to the 1980s (Masters 2008b). Now, as the CFTC describes it,
“In many physical commodities (especially agricultural commodities), cash
market participants base spot and forward prices on the futures prices that
are ‘discovered’ in the competitive, open auction market of a futures
exchange”
12 (quoted in Masters 2008b). Describing oil pricing, Platts (the
biggest pricing service for the energy industry) writes,“In the spot market,
therefore, negotiations for physical oils will typically use NYMEX as a refer-
encepoint,withbids/offersanddealsexpressedasadifferentialtothefutures
price.Using these differentials,Platts makes daily and in some cases intraday
assessments of the price for various physical grades of crude oil, which may
bereferencedinotherspot,termorderivativesdeals”(Platts2007).Ironically,
even the S&P GSCI and the DJ-AIGCI “spot” price commodity indexes are
actually “based predominantly upon the prices of the nearest-to-expiration
futurescontractsfortheirrespectivesetof commodities”(Masters andWhiteThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 31
2008).Finally,Masters (2008b) emphasizes the point: “In the present system,
price changes for key agricultural and energy commodities originate in the
futures markets and then are transmitted directly to the spot markets.”
This is not what is usually taught in economics textbooks. According
to traditional theory, “fundamentals” determine spot prices through the
forces of supply and demand (as discussed above). Futures prices are then
equal to spot prices plus the costs of carry,less convenience yield.The costs
of carry include warehousing fees and forgone interest on money that is
tied up in the contract; the convenience yield includes income that could
be earned by using the commodity until the contract date. Normally, if
supplyanddemandforfuturedeliveryareinbalance,thenthefuturesprice
should exceed the spot price because carrying costs are greater than con-
venience yields. A contango exists in this case: the futures price is higher
than the spot price, with contracts priced higher the farther out the expi-
ration date. However, following John Maynard Keynes’s seminal contribu-
tions to our textbook understanding of finance,this is not the case in most
commodity markets, since commodity producers seeking to secure the
price at which they will be able to sell their output tend to outnumber buy-
ers seeking to lock in the future price at which they will purchase.Thus,the
supply of futures contracts offered by commercial hedgers will exceed the
demand, leading to futures prices that are below cash prices—what Keynes
called the“natural backwardation”of commodity futures markets.
It is usually the case that, when there is a shortage in supply or an
excess speculative demand, this is first evidenced in the spot market, driv-
ing cash prices above futures prices. This can occur if there has been an
attempt to “corner” the market by buying up the physical supplies, so that
those who have sold futures must purchase at an excessive price to obtain
thephysicalcommodity(thisiswhathappenedintheHuntbrothers’attempt
to corner silver); it can also occur if there is a belief that there will be supply
shortages and users seek to hoard supplies (as occurs in most famines).
Here, the increasing spot price creates a backwardation that feeds into the
futuresprice.Indeed,virtuallyallthepriorexperiencesof commoditybooms
have been characterized by this configuration. However, in the current price
run-up,theoppositehasbeen thecase,asfutures typicallyhave tradedabove
spot, suggesting dominance of the market by speculative demand.32 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
For anyone seeking to buy the physical commodity, there is always the
choice between buying in the spot cash market and buying a future that is
at maturity and taking delivery. This means that no one would ever pay
more than the current spot price for a maturing futures contract,since they
both provide the same thing: spot delivery of the physical commodity. This
is called the“convergence”of futures to spot prices.This“no arbitrage”con-
dition has been used by many to claim that it is the spot price that deter-
mines the futures price,since the latter converges to the former.But it is easy
to see that this conclusion is unwarranted,as the futures price converges to
the spot price only upon maturity of the contract.During the three-month
life of the contract,the futures price is free to vary with market conditions,
as does the spot price. At maturity, it may be higher or lower than at the
origination of the contract, yet still satisfy convergence.
Further, each month, there will be a new futures contract, and many
speculators make spread trades that involve selling a nearer-term futures
contract and buying one for a longer term. In addition, as discussed above,
index funds that do not want to take delivery of their maturing contracts
will roll over their positions, selling the near-maturity contract and buying
(usually a larger amount of) the next maturity, or a longer one. This will
mean that, as older contracts mature, younger futures contracts will have
come into existence with higher prices, and those who have sold contracts
will see that they could have waited to sell at a higher price.The expectation
of continually rising futures prices thus creates an incentive to hold physical
supplies off the spot market.Those who are receiving physical supplies have
an incentive to roll them over into futures contracts with a later maturity
date,both acting to drive up spot prices in the wake of rising futures prices.
This tends to create a price series for forward futures contracts that
resemblestheyieldcurveonbonds,andwithrisingfuturesprices,thiscurve
has a positive slope associated with a contango.Thus,one test of the impact
of futures speculation on current prices has been the existence of a posi-
tively sloped futures curve. Results of statistical tests have been inconclu-
sive, but this is not surprising given the fact that the available data consists
only of the reports provided to the CFTC—which,as noted above,does not
include trading on either ICE or proprietary (over-the-counter) electronic
systems. Nonetheless, most prior commodity price booms have been char-
acterized by backwardation, while the present boom has been dominatedThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 33
by contango. This is not proof of speculation, but it is certainly consistent
with the result that would be expected in a market dominated by flows of
managed money from index speculators.
Krugman and others like the supply and demand story, but it doesn’t
work that way in many commodity markets.As previously discussed,many
commodity prices have always been administered—by oligopolists or
oligopsonists—rather than set by the impersonal forces of supply and
demand in perfectly competitive markets. Further, as market participants
and those who operate and regulate futures exchanges describe,spot prices
are set with reference to futures prices.This means that market fundamen-
tals and the forces of supply and demand cannot be the sole determinants
of the spot price. If spot prices are set through reference to futures prices,
then anything that affects futures can directly impact the spot market.
Indeed, as Figure 5 shows, there is very little divergence between crude oil
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spot prices and futures prices (more discussion of the figure follows).
While the traditional story that spot and futures prices must converge
upon expiration of the contract is correct, this does not necessarily mean
that it is future prices that must do the converging—spot prices can rise (or
fall)tomeetfuturesprices,andtheycandosoimmediately(Masters2008b).
Finally, while finance theory teaches that contango is the“natural”relation
(future prices are greater than spot prices in order to cover carrying costs),
the discussion above led to the conclusion that backwardation is normal
for many commodities because producers who want to sell dominate the
market. So the future price should be below the spot price, rising over the
life of the contract to converge with the spot price. This creates an incen-
tive for speculators to buy the futures contracts (taking long positions),
promising later delivery from producers (Kregel 2008).
Predominance of a contango can indicate a speculative market—the
demand for futures contracts is spurred by a belief that spot prices will rise.
If spot prices are set in reference to futures,a speculative boom is triggered,
because the rising spot market validates the expectations and thereby fuels
greater demand for futures contracts.Figure 5 is shaded to indicate periods
of contango in crude oil prices. From late 2004 through mid-2007, oil was
in contango, possibly indicating a speculative boom. It is also possible evi-
dence of an expected future oil shortage—which could be the cause of the
speculation in futures contracts. Or, it could be due to a flow of managed
money into futures markets,as discussed above.The timing does appear to
be about correct: the flow of managed money into commodity futures
indexes grew from 2004 through 2007, coinciding with the contango in oil
(the commodity that has the largest weighting in the indexes). This is also
the period in which the price of oil futures began to grow very quickly.
Let us review the claim that index speculators have driven the spot
price of commodities to historic levels. Commodities markets deviate sub-
stantially from the perfectly competitive model, with substantial evidence
that prices are administered rather than set by fundamental forces of sup-
ply and demand. In many cases, spot prices are determined directly by the
price of futures; in others, they are determined by expectations for future
spot prices, which are generated by commodity futures prices (with an
adjustment to reflect local market conditions—a markup or markdown
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turn,are influenced by a variety of forces,including attempts by buyers and
sellers to hedge price risk, by traditional speculators to go short or long as
they make guesses about price movements,and by index speculators diver-
sifying portfolios into a new asset class: commodities. It is no coincidence
that futures prices soared over the past four years, as huge sums of man-
aged money—from pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds,
universityendowments,andbanks(mostlyEuropean)—flowed intofutures
markets. This reinforced other factors that had been driving up prices,
including rapid growth in China and India as well as some supply con-
straints and inventory manipulation.Government policies,including export
restrictions and U.S. biofuel incentives, also played a role. These policy
choices were themselves prodded by rising commodity prices, even as they
contributedtorisingprices.Aperfectstormwascreated,oneinwhichalmost
every participant’s interest lay in continued price gains.
Manyparticipantsinandobserversof commodityfuturesmarketshave
argued that index speculation has contributed significantly to rising spot
prices.DouglasSteenland(2008),presidentandCEOof NorthwestAirlines,
provided testimony before the House of Representatives that reflected the
beliefs of many in the airlines industry (see also, Fornaro et al. 2008). The
total annual cost of jet fuel for the industry is projected to increase by 50
percent over 2007, to $60 billion. The industry believes that the Enron and
London “loopholes” that exempted a huge swath of the futures markets
from CFTC regulation allowed a surge of pension and other passive invest-
ment funds into commodity markets.
13 Steenland pointed out that in
March 2008,1.2 billion barrels of oil were traded every day on NYMEX and
the London InterContinental Exchange, with world consumption of oil at
only 87 million barrels a day. Speculators hold about two-thirds of the oil
contracts,up from about a fifth 20 years ago.A barrel of oil might be traded
20 times before it is delivered to the end user.The airlines believe that spec-
ulation adds $30 to $60 to the per-barrel price.Tyson Foods (2008) has also
been vocal in its belief that speculators are driving up the price of agricul-
tural commodities (hence,increasing the cost of producing poultry).Long-
only indexers hold contracts equal to 33–65 percent of the corn, soybean,
and wheat crops. Greenwich Associates (2008) concludes that“the entry of
new financial or speculative investors into global commodities markets is
fueling the dramatic run-up in prices.” These include pension funds that36 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
use commodities to diversify portfolios,European banks that use commod-
ity derivatives to structure retail products sold to customers, and hedge
funds that use commodities as a source of alpha.
Mike Masters, in testimony before Senate and House committees, has
made the most convincing case for a large impact coming from index spec-
ulation. A number of rebuttals to his remarks have been attempted.
Perhaps the strongest counterattack was launched by NYMEX staff. First,
they argued that Masters overstates the importance of speculators in com-
modity futures markets (NYMEX 2008).Without going deeply into details,
the data provided by the CFTC does not make it possible to clearly distin-
guish among types of market participants. The CFTC uses only three cate-
gories: commercial (historically about 50 percent), noncommercial (35–40
percent), and unreported (5–10 percent). Commercial participants are sup-
posed to be those that have an association with the physicals market—for
example, the price-hedging producers and buyers. This category is sup-
posed to exclude speculators. However, the CFTC includes in the commer-
cial category swap dealers, which are banks that provide over-the-counter
derivatives. The reasoning is that bank customers with direct links to risks
in the physicals markets can use these derivatives for hedging. However,
there is nothing to prevent the banks from providing these services to those
with no links to physicals; indeed,index speculators also use the swap deal-
ers that are counted as commercial participants. Hence, many “commer-
cial” purchasers are speculators of one type or another. The noncommercial
category is supposed to comprise the speculators—those with no direct
interest in the physical commodities—but that number is undercounted
because swap dealers are excluded.
Figure 6 allocates“nonreportables”to the noncommercial category,and
separates swap dealers from the commercial category. Note that at the time
NYMEX offered its rebuttal, the discussion centered on the April 2008
graphic. If swap dealers are largely speculators, then they could be added to
noncommercials, bringing the April total to about 80 percent of the com-
modity futures markets. That is one basis for the claim that speculation
dominates. However, according to NYMEX, that number is far too high—
because there is no basis for assuming that a large percentage of the nonre-
portablesandswapdealersarespeculating.Further,NYMEX(2008)testified
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claim that speculators dominate by reclassifying market participants.
Ironically, on August 5, the CFTC did release revised data that boosted the
proportion of contracts held by the noncommercial sector on July 15 by an
astounding25percent,to48percentof themarket,asshownabove.Inother
words, the CFTC revision accomplished precisely the opposite of what was
expected by NYMEX. Since this still excludes the swap dealers, there is now
little question that a large majority of positions are held by speculators.
What was more shocking, this adjustment resulted from reclassifying just
one trader,Vitol—which controls 10 percent of the entire oil futures market
(Davis 2008b). This jolted markets, because not only did it reveal that spec-
ulators dominate, but it also opened the possibility that positions held by
just one trader could move the market. This particular trader appears to be
a traditional speculator—one who holds shorts and longs—not an index
speculatorholdinglong-onlypositions.However,thatisnotagreatcomfort,
becausewithpositionssolarge,marketmanipulationlookslikeapossibility.
NYMEX also attempted to argue that price determination runs from
fundamentals to futures prices,with the latter converging toward spot prices
determined by the laws of supply and demand.We dealt with this argument
above.Thereisnodisputethat,overtime,pricesmustconverge,butthisdoes
nottellusanythingaboutpricedetermination.WhenNYMEX(2008)claims
that “the futures market is a derivative of the physical market, not the
Figure 6 Evolution of Speculative Trading:WTIAverage Open Interest
on NYMEX (Long and Short Positions)
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reverse,”it is speaking of some idealized market that might have existed in
the distant past, but not of today’s financialized commodities market. It is
certainly true that oil cannot be sold at $125 a barrel unless someone is
willing to pay that price, but that tells us nothing about the price that
would be obtained in a perfectly competitive market by the forces of sup-
plyanddemand—withsupplycomingfrommanyproducers,anddemand,
directly from users. In reality, supply is largely controlled to hit price, and
the demand from end users is supplemented by the demand from arbi-
tragers, manipulators, hedgers, speculators, and index “investors” with
much more money to put into play. Even the major oil pricing service,
Platts, argues that spot prices are set with reference to NYMEX futures
prices—a point also made by the CFTC when it argues that one of the two
essential services played by futures markets is price discovery!
Finally, Philip McBride Johnson, former chairman of the CFTC under
President Reagan, flatly rejects the current chairman’s claim that funda-
mentals are driving the boom: “The fact that prices have been relentlessly
trending up suggests a new type of market participant [with] a mentality
that is traditionally more in line with investing in securities than trading in
commodities.If enough of these wealthy people,or funds,or other entities
with a lot of capital decide to flip out of securities for a little while and go
into commodities, and they’re all looking for something that is going up,
and you get enough billions of dollars thinking that way, then their wish
comes true”(quoted in Bario 2008). Eckaus (2008) says flatly:“Since there is
noreasonbasedoncurrentandexpectedsupplyanddemandthatjustifiesthe
currentpriceof oil,whatisleft?Theoilpriceisaspeculativebubble.”Thissus-
picion seems to be validated by the falling oil prices that followed
Congressionalhearingsintospeculation—whichmayhaveslowedtheflowof
managed money into futures contracts since July 2008.
Policy Response
Let us assume for the moment that index speculators have helped to fuel the
apparently unprecedented broad-based commodities price boom. Should
policy react? If so, how?
The two purposes of futures markets are risk reduction through hedg-
ing and price discovery.If we look at the second function,index speculatorsThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 39
do not play a useful role because theirs is an allocative, buy-and-hold strat-
egy. They are relatively impervious to price or to bid-ask spreads.They buy
commodity futures (usually indexes of futures) to achieve a diversified
portfolio.Further,commodities are seen as an inflation hedge.However,to
the extent that index speculators help to drive up commodity spot prices
that then increase pressures on producer and consumer prices, the collec-
tive attempt to hedge against inflation actually accelerates inflation.But this
hedges a different kind of risk than the risk for which these markets were
initially designed: price risk for commodity producers and users. It is true
that as managed money flows into futures markets, it does increase the
demand for contracts offered by producers who want to hedge price risk—
thus, the inflow is a source of market liquidity to the sale side.Against that
benefit must be weighed the cost to users of the commodities—who face
rising futures prices as they compete with index speculators to hedge against
the risk of rising spot prices.
14And,of course,to the extent that index spec-
ulators cause commodity prices to rise ever upward, users of commodities
cannot really win by hedging. At best, those users who do hedge are rela-
tively better off than those who do not (Southwest Airlines is currently
doing better than the carriers that did not hedge enough jet fuel).But they,
too, continue to pay ever-higher prices.
Also worth contemplating is the end of the speculative boom.Once all
managed money has achieved the desired allocation of commodities, the
large volumes of inflows subside. Further purchases of futures contracts
will be undertaken merely to maintain an allocation. Suddenly, the liquid-
ity to which commodity producers had become accustomed begins to dry
up. Traditional speculators revise their expectations for the course of
prices; some might begin to short commodities.A strong price reversal can
take place, as the market reverts to backwardation. This is what happened
betweenmid-July,whenthepriceof oilbrushedupagainst$150abarrel,and
mid-August,when the per-barrel price dropped below $115.As sands shift,
producers who had made business plans based on price increases find that
they cannot succeed in an environment of falling commodity prices. We
have seen the result of a precipitous drop in agricultural commodity prices
several times in the past 100 years.Of course,the most significant was dur-
ing the period described in The Grapes of Wrath. The consequences for
rural America and its banks can be severe.40 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
The 1935 Congressional report that introduced the Commodity
Exchange Act to the House of Representatives quotes President Roosevelt
regarding the necessity of restricting speculation in commodity markets:
It is my belief that exchanges for dealing in securities and com-
moditiesarenecessaryandof definitevaluetoourcommercialand
agricultural life. Nevertheless, it should be our national policy to
restrict, as far as possible, the use of these exchanges for purely
speculative operations.
I therefore recommend to the Congress the enactment of legisla-
tion providing for the regulation by the Federal Government of
the operations of exchanges dealing in securities and commodi-
ties for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of values,
and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unneces-
sary, unwise, and destructive speculation.
TheActcallsforcontrollingspeculationandensuringthattheexchanges
function to provide a market for the physical commodities:
The fundamental purpose of the measure is to insure fair practice
and honest dealing on the commodity exchanges and to provide a
measure of control over those forms of speculative activity which
too often demoralize the markets to the injury of producers and
consumers and the exchanges themselves. The bill has as another
objective: the restoration of the primary function of the exchanges,
which is to furnish a market for the commodities themselves.
The legislation also specifically exempts legitimate hedging from such
restrictions:
Transactions which are shown to be bona fide hedging transac-
tions in a commodity by holders of that commodity or of prod-
ucts or byproducts thereof, or by growers of that commodity, are
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are subject to the limits fixed only to the extent that they deal for
their own account.
Clearly, we have moved far—too far—from the intentions of Congress,
financializing commodity markets with the dominant players in futures
markets having no interest in the underlying physicals.The majority of the
participants, by volume, are traditional and index speculators. While the
participation of traditional speculators offers clear benefits, position limits
must be carefully administered to ensure that their activities do not“demor-
alize” markets. It is, however, difficult to find any strong justification for
permittingentryintothesemarketsbyindexspeculatorsoperatingwithbuy-
and-hold strategies merely to diversify portfolios. It is worth recalling
Keynes’s famous warning: “Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a
steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise
becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation”(Keynes 1964).
In his Congressional testimony, Masters provided a useful analogy.
Supposethereweresometechnologicalbreakthroughsthatledtothecreation
of new medical devices and drugs that could cure cancer. Further presume
that the financial wizards on Wall Street created a pharmaceutical index to
provide an opportunity for investors to both diversify their portfolios (sup-
posehealthdeterioratescyclicallysothatpharmaspendingiscountercyclical)
and beat inflation (pharmaceutical prices rise faster than inflation). As
investors pour their money into the index fund, futures prices rise quickly—
drawing in speculators (traditional and index varieties) making bets that
priceswillcontinuetoclimb.Atsomepoint,asthemarketmovesintoastrong
contango,the drugs and devices will be purchased for inventory—to hold on
theexpectationofrapidpriceincreases.Withmuchofthesupplytakenoffthe
market,and with demand soaring (both for use and for inventory accumula-
tion),thecostsofapossiblecancercurearedrivenoutofthereachof patients.
At the same time, rising prices would induce indexes to raise their alloca-
tion targets—generating accelerating price hikes even as the funds held
claims to the total supply (and more) of cancer-curing devices and drugs.
While this might sound far-fetched, it is quite close to what happened in
commodity markets recently, as the price of grains rose beyond the reach
of the world’s poor, as ranchers slaughtered animals they could not afford42 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
to feed, and as index funds bought contracts on larger and larger portions
of the total crop supply.
If all of this isn’t scary enough, imagine a scenario in which specula-
tors were allowed to hold futures in commodified and financialized human
organs on the argument that this enhances price discovery and provides
needed liquidity to the market.
While it is certainly true that the rising prices of the commodified
pharmaceuticals would encourage more production,the question is whether
supply could grow fast enough to more than satisfy the demand of money
managers able to leverage by a factor of 30 or more—in a world in which
literally trillions of dollars are seeking diversification and inflation hedges.
Further, just as demand for biofuels is encouraging nations to destroy rain
forests and to plow the world’s grasslands to satisfy the current insatiable
demand of hedge funds for an inflation hedge, do we really want to divert
resources to produce pharmaceuticals (or organs) for storage rather than
to cure disease?
The notion that “supply and demand” efficiently allocates resources
through the price system is quaint, and has little application to today’s
money manager capitalism, in which assets are purchased with leveraged
money and with a view to price appreciation rather than to meeting con-
sumption demands. No rational policymaker would allow speculators to
purchase the cure to cancer only for storage in warehouses,nor should pol-
icymakers allow, much less encourage, money managers to fuel inflation,
currency depreciation, hunger, and unemployment by driving commodity
prices beyond the reach of consumers.
The first order of business is to direct the CFTC to broaden its mission
so that it can accomplish the overarching objective of the original
Commodity Exchange Act: to limit the effects of speculation on commod-
ity prices. This should include bringing more of the market under regula-
tion—by eliminating the various loopholes, including the Enron, London,
and swaps loopholes. Similar rules, regulations, and oversight should be
applied to all players. It is sometimes argued that this will merely force
exchanges to move outside the United States, but others have pointed out
that that is an empty threat. As Masters testified, any futures contract that
calls for physical delivery within the United States is subject to U.S. regula-
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are evading U.S. regulations without specific exemptions. Further, market
participants prefer liquid, high-volume futures markets. Given that the
United States is the largest consumer of energy and the largest producer of
food commodities, its futures markets will surely remain in demand. And
no Iowa farmer is going to turn to London to hedge corn prices in an
attempt to evade regulations.
The CFTC must reestablish and enforce position limits.
15 In emergen-
cies (such as a euphoric boom),margin requirements for purchases should
be raised. The CFTC should be directed to gather and to publish data on
participants in futures markets to help distinguish among hedgers, tradi-
tional speculators,and index speculators.When the CFTC reclassifiedVitol
as a noncommercial participant, it withheld the firm’s name. It is difficult
to see why the identity of a speculator with positions equal to 10 percent of
a futures market should be withheld from public view. Greater trans-
parency will not only permit better policy formation but also help to pro-
tect markets from manipulation. The CFTC must also work more closely
with regulators in other countries to promote greater uniformity of prac-
tices and to avoid the tendency to rush to the lowest common denomina-
tor. To accomplish all of this, the CFTC’s budget must be increased, and
future funding needs to keep pace with growth of the markets.
If, as this brief concludes, speculators dominate futures markets,
Congress should consider the costs and benefits of allowing index specula-
torstopursuebuy-and-holdstrategies.Muchof themanagedmoneyengaged
inindexspeculationbenefitsfromexplicitorimplicitgovernmentguarantees
(such as the insurance that stands behind pensions) and from tax benefits
(i.e., tax-advantaged savings).As expected, managed money is already lob-
bying to protect its turf, arguing that fiduciary responsibility dictates that
it should assimilate diversified portfolios that are insulated from business
cycles and inflation. Thus, they argue they should be permitted to retain
commodities as an asset class. However, these funds must operate within
constraints established by Congress to promote the public interest. If
Congress should find that public interest is threatened by index speculation,
then it is appropriate to prohibit commodity index replication strategies.
Masters and White (2008) have argued for revision of the prudent investor
rule to explicitly prohibit pension investment in commodities. Alternatively,
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tax, it would severely reduce the attractiveness of these markets for tax-
advantaged savings. Finally, to avoid a rapid sell-off of commodity futures
contracts, they would impose “liquidation-only” rules on index speculators
so that further purchases of commodity futures contracts would be prohib-
ited, as the funds would gradually sell out positions.
More generally,the commodities market bubble (and coming crash) is
the third such episode in recent years that resulted from the unfettered,
lemminglike herding of money seeking the highest returns, leading man-
aged money over the cliff. To be sure, there have been many earlier exam-
ples—municipal bonds in the 1960s, commercial paper in the late 1960s,
real estate investment trusts in the early 1970s, commercial real estate and
leveraged buyouts in the 1980s, and so on. The problem is that managed
money has grown tremendously and leverage ratios have risen, as the taste
for risk grew even as the ability to perceive risk became ever scarcer.
(Minsky used to attribute this in part to fading memories of the Great
Depression; many of today’s money managers cannot even remember the
1980s,muchlessthe1930s.)Asaresult,wehave,astheysay,commandover
too much money chasing too few good asset classes with what are perceived
to be acceptable returns.This is why everything is becoming financialized—
fromcreditcarddebttosubprimemortgagesandfromstudentloanstopork
bellyfutures.PerhapsmanagedmoneywenttoofarwhenitturnedAmerica’s
homes, energy, and food into asset classes ripe for gambling.We should not
wait for it to find the next asset class (human organs?).
Assuming that the commodities market boom is coming to what
might be an ugly end,Congress also needs to consider what can be done to
cushion the collapse. It is all too easy to say that government ought to stay
away and let the market punish foolish speculators.Recent experience with
the yearlong credit crisis suggests this will not happen, and it probably
should not be allowed to happen.Those holding futures contracts that can-
not be rolled over except at catastrophic loss include our pension funds,
banks (admittedly, mostly foreign), and hedge funds. Further, to the extent
that futures prices affect spot prices, producers of agricultural commodi-
ties will be devastated when they find that market prices won’t cover the
costs incurred.Tight global food supplies will be restricted further if farm-
ers react the way they usually do to falling prices: by destroying crops and
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crude oil prices; it is already unlikely that the United States will reach its
biofuels production goals even with the subsidies granted by Congress
because of the high price of corn and policy-induced shortages. To help
relieve distress,Congress needs to consider ramped-up global food aid this
year,purchasingagriculturaloutputtohelpU.S.farmersfacingfallingprices,
to be distributed to the world’s hungry. American consumers need help in
the form of energy relief; this can be accomplished through checks that can
be called a tax rebate or a fiscal stimulus—whichever is more politically
palatable. This will help to recharge the U.S. economy. American produc-
ers—especially of alternative energy—also need to be protected (temporar-
ily) from falling commodity prices. More subsidies for wind, solar, and
geothermal energy will be needed.
The U.S. (and global) financial sector will continue to reel from the
crisis that began with subprime mortgages; falling commodity prices will
onlymakethatverymuchworse.Pensionfundswillbethreatened,perhaps
depleting the already shaky Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The
FDIC’s “insurance” fund is facing a payout equal to nearly one-fifth of its
total reserves due to the failure of just one bank (IndyMac); it is likely that
many more medium-size banks and some big ones will fail—the total
could be more than a hundred and will threaten the FDIC’s solvency.
Congress will have to walk a fine line between allowing the truly deserving
to bear pain, and a pragmatic bailout to keep the social costs of failures
from hindering recovery. The credit crunch has already dried-up lending;
it could get considerably worse.Still,if a lot of wealth is not wiped out,there
will be tremendous pressure on money managers to find yet another asset
class ripe with possibilities for lofty returns. Without greater oversight, the
“cure” could be worse than the disease. So bailouts will be needed, but
strings must be attached in the form of regulatory constraint.
It is interesting that Credit Suisse (2008) has been pushing fixed-rate
swaps linked to commodities such as iron.This would put managed money
into direct competition with users of natural resource commodities—skip-
ping the intermediate step of going through futures markets. Wall Street
bankshavealsobeenpromotingexchange-tradedfundsinordertosellcom-
modityindexestoretailinvestors (Masters andWhite 2008).Nomatter what
anyone believes about the relationship between spot and futures prices, this
development makes it clear that policymakers must take the initiative to46 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
determine what should be financialized to serve as appropriate asset classes
for our protected funds.
Senators Joseph I. Lieberman, Susan Collins, and Maria Cantwell
introduced the bipartisan Commodity Speculation Reform Act of 2008 on
July 10 to amend the Commodity Exchange Act. It would accomplish sev-
eral of the objectives outlined above: it would direct the CFTC to restrict
theabilityof traderstoescapeU.S.oversightbymovingtoforeignexchanges,
and apply position limits to all food- and energy-related futures and deriv-
atives contracts (whether on exchanges or over-the-counter)—exempting
only bona fide hedging (Lieberman 2008). It would also prevent the CFTC
from delegating responsibility for setting position limits to the exchanges,
and from substituting reporting for actual speculative position limits (forc-
ing the commission to act more like a regulator than a cheerleader). All of
this would move policy in the right direction.Unfortunately,the legislation
faces a long haul through Congress (and a probable veto by President Bush)
(OMB 2008).Further,it does not address the bigger problem of the propen-
sity of managed money to destabilize one market after another. The wis-
dom of guaranteeing and promoting the growth of managed money is an
issue that needs to be addressed,but it is one that will almost certainly have
to await a new administration and a new Congress.
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Notes
1. With, of course, the caveat that, as of mid-August 2008, it looks like
commodity prices might have finally started coming down.
2. Note that several economists have denied that oil prices have been
driven up by speculators because inventories have remained relatively
constant for the past couple of years. However, the best place to store
oil is in the ground!
3. In its final report, the CFTC recommends preliminary actions to
increase transparency and improve controls in the marketplace, along
with the creation of a new “swap dealer” classification for reporting
purposes. Lukken states that the new recommendations “represent
steps in modernizing the agency’s approach to oversight, while ensur-
ing that the markets remain competitive, open, and on U.S. soil”
(quoted in CFTC 2008b). However, the report also states that, while
therewasanincreaseinthenetnotionalvalueof commodityindexbusi-
ness in crude oil futures, it appears to be due to an appreciation of the
value of existing investments caused by the rise in crude oil prices, and
not the result of more money flowing into commodity index trading.
4. Asdiscussedbelow,concernsthattheCFTCwasintentionallymislead-
ing Congress were heightened when it became known that the com-
mission had reclassified one very large trader as “noncommercial” (a
category comprising speculators) just before it released its interim
report in July. The reclassification had been withheld from the report
and from testimony presented to Congress even though it tipped the
balance toward speculator dominance of futures markets.
5. Most institutional investors that want to take positions in commodities
go through Wall Street banks that arrange over-the-counter commodity
index swaps.
6. Interestingly, Gregory Mocek, who had been director of enforcement at
the CFTC since 2002, left the agency in early July to join the law firm of
McDermottWill&Emory,whichrepresentstheInternationalSwapsand
Derivatives Association on federal antimanipulation efforts (Lobsenz
2008). Students of the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis will recall a similar
“revolving door” in which regulators were offered lucrative positions in
those institutions they were supposed to oversee. It was reported that
Mocek’s new firm said he “would be invaluable in helping their clients48 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
fend off government energy manipulation investigations—an area that
Mocek helped pioneer at the CFTC.” Apparently, Mocek had been a
feared enforcement officer, helping to lead cases against Enron,
Amaranth, Dynegy, and other large energy companies. Perhaps energy
price manipulators can sleep better now.
7. Stephen J.Obie,regional counsel for the agency’s NewYork office,was
named acting director of the division.
8. For example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) Statement of Investment Policy issued on February 19,
2008,includes commodities as a major part of its inflation-linked asset
class, which comprises 5 percent of its total portfolio. The allocation
within the inflation-linked asset class is as follows: commodities, 1.5
percent; inflation-linked bonds, 1 percent; infrastructure, 1.5 percent;
and forestland, 1 percent. It obtains its positions in commodities
through commodity futures that try to match the S&P GSCI Total
Return Index. Note that the correlations that encouraged managed
money to move into commodities could well break down by the flood
of money, since those correlations are obtained from a period in which
such flows were insignificant. Further, if a crisis follows the current
boom, it is unlikely that past correlations will persist.
9. Index speculators do not want to receive physical commodities, so they
“enter into a prepackaged trade called a ‘calendar spread.’ In a calendar
spread,a trader simultaneously buys a more distant future and sells their
closer-to-expiration future” (Masters and White 2008). Because many
indexspeculatorswillbedoinga“Goldmanroll”ataboutthesametime,
the prices of expiring contracts are depressed, while those of the more
distant future contracts are pushed up due to “index roll congestion.”
This generates profits for speculators on spread trades, much of which
arereapedbytheWallStreetbanksthatprovideswapservices.According
to John Dizard (2007),this cost index speculators about 150 basis points
of return in 2007,and generated approximately $60 billion for the firms
that manage the index funds.
10. Strictly speaking, index speculators do not “buy” the index but rather
outsource management of their futures trading to one of theWall Street
banks,which tries to replicate one of the indexes by purchasing a basket
of commodity futures contracts with the same weighting scheme as theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 49
index (Masters and White 2008). It is reported that 85–90 percent of
institutional investors enter into over-the-counter commodity index
swaps withWall Street banks.Approximately70percentof thisbusiness
is handled by just four banks: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,
JPMorgan Chase, and Barclays. These four account for about a quarter
of all contracts on the commodity futures exchanges (Greenwich
Associates 2008, Masters and White 2008).
11. As we will see,the“spot”price reflected in the index is actually based on
the futures contract price for the commodities included in the index.
12. Not all commodities are priced this way; this description applies to
wheat, corn, and soybeans in agriculture, and to WTI crude oil, heat-
ing oil, gasoline, and natural gas in the energy sector. However, other
commodities are priced relative to these. For example, coal is priced
relative to oil. For this reason, prices in futures markets tend to affect
spot prices across a range of commodities.See Masters 2008b,pp.3–4.
13. The so-called“London loophole”refers to the CFTC’s decision in 1999
to allow traders using the London exchanges to avoid position limits
to which U.S. exchanges were subject. ICE has taken advantage of this.
The Enron loophole, which dates to 2000, exempts electronic trading
from U.S. regulation. Its namesake used the exemption to corner the
market for California’s supply of electricity.
14. This is why Masters and White (2008) insist that index speculators
“suck”liquidity from markets, as they take only one side of the trades.
15. Shockingly, the CFTC has taken the opposite view: “In general,
position limits are not needed for markets where the threat of market
manipulation is non-existent or very low” (www.cftc.gov/industry-
oversight/marketsurveillance/speculativelimits.html#P8_883). This
reflects the commission’s erroneous interpretation that manipulation
alone—not speculation—poses a threat worthy of oversight.50 Public Policy Brief, No. 96
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